The fundamental question for researchers of international relations vis-a-vis explaining Russian aggression in the second half of the 20th and during the 21st century is whether that aggression can be attributed to ideology or inherent imperialism.
If a researcher believes that the USSR expanded only because of the idea of communist globalism, then there is no reason for post-communist Russia to, from the very beginning in the 1990s, exert its will through force on the Moldovan or Georgian nation, which it did.
What connects Stalin’s, Yeltsin’s or Putin’s aggression is not common political ideology, as they didn’t share one, it’s radical statism – the veneration of the state as the supreme political value. Whichever leader sits on this throne, the tide takes him to the same destination.
Russia is all and everything is Russia, this is the political Gospel of the Kremlin through different political eras. The ever-present corruption of authorities on all levels of government is irrelevant to the central position of the state in the political pantheon.
Therefore, if the researcher doesn’t understand Russian statism, he may come to the conclusion that communist Russia was aggressive because of the communist ideology alone and that Russias after it were aggressive because they wanted to have a stable backyard in their region.
This Russia is a pure theoretical Western invention. A highly centralized and militarized Russia that only wants its own sphere of influence and then it will stop posing a danger. After which trade might ensue, capital for all. That’s not how Russian statism functions.
The state and its zone of power keep expanding until stopped from without or by crumbling from within. Stalin stopped in Germany, because he couldn’t go any further. Afterwards his heirs tried to bring the West down internally, in order to continue expanding.
Yeltsin was stopped by internal struggles, but he managed to keep the state’s borders intact and even briefly invade Russia’s neighbors – Moldova and Georgia. His heir, Putin, used this base of power to once again begin expansion.
Where Putin will be stopped is entirely up to the West, the only force capable of stopping him. He might be stopped in Eastern Ukraine, he might be stopped at the Polish border or he, either his heirs, might be stopped in Germany once more.
If a centralized and militarized Russia continues to exist, its expansion will not end. There is no natural sphere of influence that satisfies the never-ending thirst of the state-god. The expansion may come in phases, but until it is physically stopped, it will not end.
If a centralized and militarized Russia continues to exist, its expansion will not end. There is no natural sphere of influence that satisfies the never-ending thirst of the state-god. The expansion may come in phases, but until it is physically stopped, it will not end.
Only those who suffer Russia’s attacks or those who live and breathe Russia, their nationality not withstanding, can advise on how to strategize against Russia. General theorists can’t conjure up a befitting strategy, and mentioning Chekhov’s gun in an interview doesn’t count.
If Russian statism is understood, then it doesn’t matter whether Washington gives a damn about Ukraine, the Caucasus or the Baltics, because Russia doesn’t plan on stopping. If its militarily exhausted, it will use propaganda and sabotage to prepare the field for new expansions.
Western disinterest and feeding the Russian empire with new fiefdoms will not make it any more benign. That is why it is imprudent to sacrifice Ukraine. It will not be the last sacrifice not while there is a centralized, militarized Russia.